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Abstract 
In the economics profession there is a fierce debate whether industrial and innovation 
policy should be targeted to specific sectors or firms. This paper discusses the welfare 
effects of such targeted policies from the perspective of strategic game theory of the 
firm. A theoretical case for picking winners through a preferential innovative policy is 
discussed in a third-market international trade model, which is shown to hold without 
evoking retaliation from foreign competitors.  However, in practice information 
uncertainties remain a concern. The question whether in this case ‘backing winners’ is a 
wise policy option depends on the characteristics of the information asymmetries and 
on the extent the government is able to design selection procedures which minimize the 
transaction costs that may be caused from the market participants’ opportunistic 
behavior.  
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1. Introduction 
Both in theoretical economic analyses and in the policy arena, there is a debate about whether 
innovation and industrial policies favouring certain targeted industries or firms are welfare 
enhancing or not. For example, the “innovation platform”, a think tank organised by the Dutch 
government with the prime minister as chairman, has selected a number of economic sectors 
which are believed to have a key role in the knowledge economy of the Netherlands. These 
sectors will have some priority in obtaining support through government funding. This policy 
of selecting and consequently ‘backing winners’ was inspired by an advice by the Advisory 
Council on Science and Technology (AWT, 2003). Yet much criticism was raised both against 
the selection procedure and the presumption that the government is able to predict which 
sectors or firms would be winners in innovation. For instance, Jacobs and Theeuwes (2005) 
asserted that it would be better to back ‘challengers’ instead of winners, however without 
indicating how the government would be able to decide about these challengers. The Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, in a report on innovation policy, criticized the procedure of 
selecting key innovative sectors by arguing that backing winners may lead to protection of 
existing structures, institutions and interests (WRR, 2008).  The procedure excludes innovative 
outsiders indeed, which do not yet have the power and size to qualify as winner. Moreover it is 
unclear why winners need government support anyhow.   
This paper discusses the options for a targeted industrial and innovation policy from the 
perspective of a strategic game among firms or sectors, where welfare effects of such targeted 
policy may stem from a cost reduction. Government support may take various forms and the 
conventional debate around the benefits and the scepticisms of industrial/public/trade policies 
will all matter one way or another.  For a small open economy, in that most of the modern 
industries are exposed to the international competition, most of the government intervention 
will naturally take the international trade policy feature. While the conventional wisdom of 
laisser-faire is valid, in large part, under the idealized world of perfect competition, it has been 
identified that a strategic incentive to intervene with international trade for welfare-enhancing 
benefits of the policy imposing country under imperfectly competitive market structures may 
exist (e.g. Brander, 1985). Such shift in the theoretical stance was made from recognition of the 
interactive feature among the firms and governments, which is contrasted to the conventional 
economic reasoning based on the terms-of-trade advantage favouring restricting trade rather 
than promoting it (see Brander, 1995, for a good survey). The policy tools can be various, 
including tariffs and non-tariff instruments, export/production/R&D subsidies and even more 
subtle government procurement details. The arguments received criticisms as well, which were 
mainly clustered upon its ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ feature and the possibility of a mutually 
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destructive trade war. Subsidies to specific industries or firms may lead to distortion of 
international competition and may lead to retaliation, in which case the policy has a negative, 
instead of the warranted positive effect on national welfare.  
While the conventional discussions have been made around the structure of uniform – all the 
beneficiary firms are treated equally - policy, an asymmetric redesign of a uniformly-optimal 
policy may bring about a new incentive of the strategic trade policy: the industry-wise profits 
can be newly created without affecting the other trading partners and therefore without the 
usual retaliatory concern. This new feature is particularly strengthened when a public policy 
aims to encourage the R&D activities by the firms.  Domestic firms can be unequally treated to 
create an asymmetric structure of the firms’ effective marginal costs. The restructured cost 
conditions among the firms then sets a new game rule for the firms to rationalize their output 
decisions, which may serve to save upon market-wise production costs for the benefit of the 
policy-imposing country’s profit increase (Jo, 2008). This profit creation can be sustained for 
various technologies and thus it is distinguished from the conventional profit creating argument 
in the literature which is valid only when economy of scale prevails in the production 
technology.  Also, since this new profit creation aspect of strategic R&D subsidy remains valid 
without affecting the other trade-involved countries, both the other exporting competitors and 
the importing economy, it is robust to the usual trade war concern. It can be even shown that 
such strategic benefits of a non-uniform R&D policy can enhance domestic profits even when 
the free trade is initially optimal. While the theoretical aspects of the new argument can be 
well-grounded, the practical choice of the policy details still remains questionable. For example, 
firms may take extra actions to be given a favour by the policy authority. It may create 
unhealthy transaction costs from the social welfare perspective without a visible countervailing 
benefit, whereas firms may take it as an incentive to economize upon their pre-policy cost 
conditions so that they can be picked as a winner group. The point being that the strategic 
feature of industrial/trade policies naturally self-contains the flip sides in terms of the firms’ 
behaviour and its resulting welfare implications, it will be critical to sort out the important 
factors for the success of an industrial policy while, at the same time, staying alert for the 
possibilities that the undesired negative effects may be caused. 
This paper aims to provide a theoretical and qualitative assessment of the pro and con side of an 
industrial policy so that it can give a hint under which circumstances the government innovative 
initiatives and targeted policies can be welfare enhancing. In the perspective of the policy 
discussions on whether, and if so, how to back winners – or challengers -  the paper focuses on 
the dynamic feature an industrial policy naturally induces in the private sector through their 
own rationalizing behaviour. Together with the potential rationale of backing winners, the 
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paper also presents the issues for which a policy authority has to be alert for a successful 
implementation of such a targeted policy. In this respect, our analysis sheds a meaningful light 
on the on-going efforts by the government to bring about efficiency gains and a welfare 
improvement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates the above-mentioned 
‘aggregate-profit creation’ effect of a non-uniform R&D policy and the theoretical justification 
of an unequal treatment of the domestic firms, which a government may be attracted to. This 
strategic effect is shown to be greater as the domestic firms are treated more discriminatorily. 
Section 3 then discusses the practical implications. The robustness and benefits of the idea of 
backing winners is highlighted and the issue of how to rationalize upon the cost-saving effects 
of an innovative policy is also discussed. Other benefits and concerns related with the 
incomplete information and the proper policy design are also addressed. Section 4 touches upon 
the distinction between the corrective and strategic objectives of a policy and redistribution 
scheme matter from a political economic concern, and section 5 contains concluding remarks. 
2. A Model for the Basic Rationale 
This section presents a two-county two-sector third-market international trade model to 
illustrate that a country has a strategic incentive to introduce non-uniform R&D policies to 
create industry-wise profits without affecting the trade-related countries. This potential 
rationale will be used as the benchmark model to sort out the factors that may matter for a 
successful implementation of an innovative initiative. First, the conventional case with the 
initially uniform R&D policy is reviewed so as to emphasize its beggar-thy-neighbour feature. 
Next the aggregate-profit creation effect of a non-uniform structure of an industrial policy is 
discussed. The analysis leads to the main policy guideline, that ‘backing’ the right targets – 
both present and potential – should be the more important rationale than simply picking the 
winners when an innovative industrial policy is considered, while the latter case may still be 
justified under limited ideal situations.  
The simplifying assumptions of the basic model are as follows. Each of the two countries, 
domestic and foreign, is endowed with a single factor of production, referred to as labor and 
denoted by L and L* respectively using which the firms produce a numeraire good and a 
homogenous oligopoly good. Consumers in the two countries consume only the numeraire 
good2, which is produced under competitive conditions with constant returns to scale. The 
                                                
2
 Domestic consumption of the oligopoly good and various returns to scale can be easily incorporated 
without affecting the main results. 
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oligopoly sector in each country has n ( i = 1, 2, …, n) and n* ( j = 1, 2, …, n*) Cournot firms 
and produces under constant marginal costs only to export to the third-market. The trade is 
assumed to be balanced by implicitly assuming that the numeraire good is imported from the 
third-market in exchange for the export of the oligopoly good. The number of firms in the 
oligopoly sector is assumed to be fixed due to the existence of some form of entry and exit 
barriers. In this third-market framework, there would be no scope for an import-protective 
device. Rather, a government may seek to intervene with trade by promoting exports in one 
form or another. While this strategic aspect of an export promoting trade policy may be best 
presented through export subsidies, R&D policies will be considered here since the aggregate 
profit-creation effect to be demonstrated in the main sections below does not occur under 
export subsidies3, let alone the GATT Codes limiting the practice of the latter. Initially, only the 
domestic government imposes an R&D subsidy and it is assumed to be applied uniformly to all 
domestic firms. The case to be considered here is a two-stage game4 in which government 
decides upon a uniform R&D subsidy in the first stage, and the firms compete in quantities 
under the Cournot conjecture in the second stage possibly over more-than-one finite periods. 
The time structure of the game here is different from a typical one-shot game or a conventional 
dynamic extension of it in that the cost-reducing benefit of an R&D policy is realized over time. 
The Cournot conjecture is only for demonstrational convenience and the main argument can be 
extended to almost all conjectural variations. 
2.1. Criticisms against the Conventional Uniform Policy 
Let xi and yj denote exports to the third oligopoly market by domestic firm i (=1,2,..,n) and 
foreign firm j (=1,2,..,n*) which add up to the total industry output Q.  ci and cj* denote each 
domestic and foreign firm’s marginal cost and πi and πj* denote each firm’s profit from their 
third-market sales. Assuming the intra-country symmetric costs for the initial state, we have 
ci=c, cj*=c*, xi=x, yj=y, Q=nx+n*y, πi=π and  πj*=π* for all i and j. Let s denote the uniform 
R&D subsidy to each domestic firm. Then, the after-subsidy marginal cost for a domestic firm 
can be defined as 
                                     - ( - ) - - (( -1) )= = +k c S s s c n sα β α β                              (1) 
where S = ns is the total R&D expenditure by the domestic government.  β(>0) represents the 
cost-reducing effect of the R&D subsidy to a firm on its own marginal cost and α(>0) 
represents the external cost-reducing effect spilled over from the R&D subsidy to all the other 
domestic firms. The spillover effect is assumed to work within the national border only, which 
                                                
3
 Jo (2009) discusses differences in strategic effects of export subsidies and R&D subsidies. 
4
 R&D process is only implicitly treated through its cost-saving effect. This is to focus on the strategic 
benefits of R&D policy by avoiding unnecessary complexity that would follow an explicit treatment.  
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can be easily extended to the case of an international spillover. Let P(Q) be the inverse demand 
for the oligopoly good in the third market. Then the firms’ profits are defined by 
      ( , ; ) ( ) (( 1) )π x y s P Q x cx n α β sx= − + − + ; ( , ; ) ( ) *π* x y s P Q y c y= − ,                        (2) 
and, considering that the cost-reducing benefit of the R&D subsidy is realized over time, say T 
periods, the relevant domestic welfare would be the following T-period discounted value of 
domestic labor income (L) plus domestic firms' profit from the third-market (nπ) net of one shot 
government subsidy expenditures (ns) with δ being the discount factor:   
                                  
1
1
( ) ( )
T
T t
t
W s;δ δ L nπ ns−
=
= + −∑ .                                                       (3) 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is defined by the optimal subsidy s 
satisfying the following optimization condition 
                               
1
1
( ) ( 1) 0−
=
= − =∑
T
T t
S S
t
W s;δ n δ π                                                         (4)                          
and the T-repetition of the one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the second stage as follows: 
          (( 1) ) 0xπ P xP c n α β s′= + − + − + = ;   ,0* =−′+= cPyPπ*y                              (5) 
We assume that the usual regularity conditions hold globally; (i) P''(Q) < 0 or not too much if 
positive5, (ii) second order conditions for the firms ( 2 0xxπ xP P′′ ′= + < , 2 0*yyπ yP P′′ ′= + < ), (iii) 
x and y are strategic substitutes ( 0xy xP Ppi ′′ ′= + < ; * 0yx yP Ppi ′′ ′= + < ) and (iv) the equilibrium 
is interior and each firm is exporting a positive amount. Then the global uniqueness of the 
Cournot equilibrium is implied, and a comparative statics reveals the followings: (i)  xs > 0, ys < 
0, (ii) Ps < 0, Qs > 0 and (iii) πs > 0, π*s < 0 . We can further show that the positive optimal 
R&D subsidy which maximizes the national welfare WT  exists for large T and δ. 6  This 
unilateral incentive to offer a strategic R&D subsidy is consistent with the conventional 
findings: an R&D subsidy imposed in the first stage alters the firms’ strategic interaction in the 
second stage of the game and thereby makes domestic firms’ aggressive behavior credible in 
the market share rivalry, enhancing domestic national welfare even net of subsidy expenditure. 
This national incentive however is not confined to one country but reciprocal. It can be easily 
shown by considering the joint global welfare *( , *) ( , *)W W s s W s sτ τ τ≡ + , in which the T*-
period foreign welfare is 
                                                
5
 This is to avoid the indeterminacy of the optimal form of the policy. 
6
 As is well known through the other literature, the signs depend jointly on the relative sizes of n, n* and 
the sign of P˝, while the linear demand case is independent of these parameters.  A large n, in particular, 
induces over-competition among the domestic firms and may lead to a negative s.  For detailed proofs, 
see the appendix in Jo (2008) for the R&D policy case and Leahy and Montana (1998) for the export 
subsidy case: the working mechanisms of the policies are not too different from each other. 
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                  ( ) 1
1
( ; *) ) *
T*
tT*
t
W*) (s* δ δ* (L* n* π* n* s−
=
= + −∑ ,                                    (6) 
with π* = Px – c*y +((n – 1)α* + β*)s*y and s*, α*, β*, δ*, T* defined analogously.  By 
analogy, the foreign government’s unilateral incentive for an R&D subsidy can be implied as 
well, and we can readily construct further details to conclude that the mutual R&D subsidies by 
both governments turns out to be jointly sub-optimal. 7  The skepticism of this prisoners’ 
dilemma phenomenon of the R&D subsidy game is reinforced and the trade war remains 
concern. 
2.2. Non-uniform Innovative Policy and Aggregate Profit Creation 
The conventional discussion as reviewed above assumed a uniform subsidy. When an R&D 
policy takes a non-uniform structure, however, a new strategic feature can be drawn by which 
national policy authorities may be motivated to consider an intervention. An asymmetric 
treatment of the domestic firms through a non-uniform system of R&D policy may successfully 
manipulate the firms' decision in the third-market and improve the national welfare without 
affecting other countries. Below we show the superiority of a non-uniform policy to a uniform 
structure when the domestic firms are homogeneous in terms of their cost structure. Later in 
section 3.1, we will extend it to the general case of asymmetric costs. The issue of sensitivity of 
the optimal policy form to the details of competition mode being one of the most effective 
skepticism against the conventional strategic trade policy, the robustness of the argument for 
various competition modes will also be discussed in section 3.1. 
Suppose that the firms in each country have the same technology and thus share the same 
marginal costs. Assuming that the Cournot equilibrium is interior and all firms export positive 
quantities to the third-market, the uniform R&D subsidies s (≥0) and s* (≥0) will constitute an 
initial equilibrium.  Given s and s* from the first stage, the first order conditions for profit 
maximization in the second stage of the game are the same as (5):  
            (( 1) ) 0xπ P xP c n α β s′= + − + − + = ;   ,0* =−′+= cPyPπ*y                         (5’) 
where (( 1) )k c n α β s≡ − − + and **)*)1*((** sβαnck +−−≡ . Summing the first order 
conditions across all the firms in the oligopoly yields  
                           
* * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0n n P Q QP Q nk n k′+ + − + = .                                            (7) 
                                                
7
 ( ) 1* * * * *
1
1
τ tτ
S S S S S
t
W W W W n δ πτ τ τ
−
=
 
= + = = − 
 
∑ and ( )* * * * *1*
1
1
τ
τ t
S S S S S
t
W W W W n δ πτ τ τ −
=
 
= + = = − 
 
∑ using 
implicit function theorem and, since *Sπ  and *Sπ are negative, it follows 0
τ
SW < and * 0
τ
SW < . Reducing 
the equilibrium subsidies improves the joint welfare. 
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When the demand P(Q) is non-convex or not-too-convex as assumed in the basic model, the 
implicit function theorem guarantees a unique Q. It is obvious then that the industry output Q, 
the price P and therefore the industry-wide revenue PQ all depend only on the sum of the 
marginal costs nk + n*k* but not on their distribution across the firms.8 This independence 
implies that a rearrangement of the initially uniform subsidies into a non-uniform way 
preserving the total subsidy expenditure does not affect the industry output and price, while the 
composition of the equilibrium output of each firm changes.  To prove, suppose that the 
domestic government redesigns the initially uniform R&D subsidy {s: ns = S} to {si: 
∑
=
==
n
i i Snss1 } in such a way that the variance of the subsidies increases while preserving 
the total R&D subsidy expenditure S and the new equilibrium still remains interior, where si  
denotes the R&D subsidy to domestic firm i (if positive). For simplicity, the foreign subsidy is 
assumed to remain uniform. Then the domestic firm i’s marginal cost after the redesign 
becomes ( ( ) )i i ik c α S s βs≡ − − −  whereas foreign firms’ marginal cost remains the same at k*.  
The first order conditions after the domestic subsidy redesign change to 
     
( ) ( ) 0, 1,2,...,ix i iiπ P Q x P Q k i n′= + − = = ,   
*( ) ( ) 0*yπ P Q yP Q k′= + − = .          (8)         
Since {si} is such that ∑
=
≡=
n
i i Snss1 and the equilibrium is interior, the sum of marginal costs 
**))1((**11 knSnnckk
n
ji
n
i ++−−=+ ∑∑ == βα  does not change. Then we have the 
following observation: 
 
Observation 1: The total industry output Q and the price P remain unchanged and so does the 
industry-wise revenue PQ. That is, ∆P = ∆Q = ∆(PQ) = 0.  
 
Now we will see how domestic firms rationalize their choices when the structure of the subsidy 
is modified. Denoting the initial outputs of the domestic and foreign firms by x and y, the 
following first order conditions need to be satisfied: 
      
nikkQPxxQP ii ,...,2,1,0)()()()( ==∆+−′∆++ ,                                   (9) 
                *,...,2,1,0*)*()()()( njkkQPyyQP jj ==∆+−′∆++ ,                              (10) 
where ∆ denotes the changes caused by the redesign of the domestic subsidy. Since Q remains 
the same and ∆kj* = 0, (8) implies that the above conditions (9) and (10) are reduced to 
0)( =∆−′∆ ii kQPx   and   0=∆ jy . 
                                                
8
 The observation that industry output and price in a Cournot industry are independent of the distribution 
of marginal costs has undoubtedly been noted and used several times in the literature. For example, see 
Bergstrom and Varian (1985), Salant and Shaffer(1999) or Bandyopadhyay et al (2004). 
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Since 0<′P , it follows that ∆xi and ∆ki take the opposite sign from each other and the 
following observation is implied.  
Observation 2:  When the initial subsidy is redistributed in a non-uniform way as above, we 
observe that the output of a firm experiencing a subsidy decrease will contract and the output 
of a firm experiencing a subsidy increase will expand while there will be no change in the 
output of a firm – either domestic or foreign - whose subsidy unchanged.  
 
Now we are ready to discuss the main feature of the arguments. 0=∆=∆=∆ jyQP  implies 
that the foreign and the third countries are not affected, allowing us to ignore the external effect 
of the subsidy redesign on the other involved countries and focus on the domestic welfare only. 
Since it also implies that the domestic firms’ aggregate revenue will not change, the industry-
wide aggregate profits of the domestic firms will increase if and only if the domestic firms' 
aggregate cost of production decreases. This aggregate profit gain to the domestic firms 
therefore will improve the national welfare and the joint welfare of all three countries involved 
improves as well. In the discussions below, we explore and highlight this new feature of 
‘aggregate profit creation’ of strategic non-uniform R&D policies, which comes through an 
asymmetric treatment of the domestic firms and its aggregate cost saving effect.  This cost 
saving effect will turn out to be greater as the subsidies are redesigned in a more discriminatory 
way.  The intuition behind can be clearly highlighted when the initially-uniform subsidies are 
redesigned only across the two firms as illustrated in the Appendix. Now we consider the 
general case in which all the firms are treated differently from one another. From the first order 
conditions (8), the equilibrium output of the domestic firm i is given by PPkx ii ′−= )(  and 
the aggregate production cost for the domestic firms will be defined by  
     
           
2
1 1 1 1
1n n n ni
i i i i i
i i i i
k P Pk x k k k
P P P
= = = =
−
= = −
′ ′ ′
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                                           (11) 
Using the variance identity for {ki; i = 1, 2, ..., n}, we can rewrite the above aggregate cost to 
                           
( )
∑∑
∑
==
=
′
−










−
′
=
n
i
i
n
i
n
i i
kii kP
P
n
k
nσ
P
xk
11
2
2
121
                                    (12) 
where 2kσ is the variance of {ki}. Since P' < 0 and ∑ =
n
i ik1 remains unchanged, the aggregate 
cost i
n
i i xk∑ =1 decreases when the variance 
2
kσ  increases. Noting 
222 ))1(( sk σβαnσ +−=  in 
which 2
sσ  denotes the variance of the non-uniform domestic R&D subsidies {si}, we can 
conclude that the aggregate production cost of the domestic firms becomes lower as the 
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variance of the subsidies becomes greater. Domestic aggregate profit increases accordingly and 
thus domestic and joint world welfare improves, which effects are greater as the domestic firms 
are treated more discriminatorily. The following corollary summarizes the discussion.  
Corollary 3: Suppose that the uniformly optimal R&D subsidy s prevailed and domestic 
government redesigns it in a non-uniform way so that ∑
=
==
n
i i
Snss
1
and the new Nash 
equilibrium remains interior. Then, the domestic national welfare improves – more with a 
greater degree of non-uniformity of the subsidies – while the foreign and the third importing 
countries remain unaffected.  
Note that while the foreign R&D subsidy in the initial state may not be ruled out, the skeptical 
concern of a foreign retaliation, if any, is only a pre-redesign concern. Since the foreign country 
is not additionally affected by the domestic subsidy redesign, the aggregate profit creation 
effects per-se does not cause an additional foreign retaliation concern and the non-uniform 
R&D subsidy system turns out to be Pareto-superior to the uniform subsidies. A country may 
be attracted to heavily subsidize a few firms while accommodating the loss to the firms 
receiving less subsidies through an appropriate national redistribution scheme. It is also 
noteworthy here that the incentive for an unequal treatment of the domestic firms remains valid 
even when free trade was initially optimal and no ex-ante R&D policy was presumed. A 
detailed discussion is skipped but the necessary action will have to combine both R&D 
subsidies and taxes if no new public expenditure is to be financed. The R&D expenditure and 
revenue can be cancelled out while the rationalizing behavior among the firms can create 
aggregate profits whose working mechanism is the same as the above. Or subsidizing a few (or 
all) firms through a newly financed fund may be considered as well if the expected welfare gain 
is big enough to cancel out this subsidy expenditure.  Since no ex-ante efficiency difference 
exists and an asymmetric policy is applied in these cases, an appropriate redistribution scheme 
will have to be introduced to justify an arbitrary selection of those to be subsidized and those to 
be taxed. As an additional remark, the main argument can be extended to many directions 
including the case of heterogeneous costs among the firms and non-Cournot competition modes, 
the details of which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Practical Implications for Backing Winners 
The reason to focus on R&D policies as a way to conduct strategic industrial policy is that it is 
the most relevant strategic policy tool under the current WTO regulations which prohibit a 
direct export or product subsidy for the developed countries. The analysis of section 2 shows 
that a non-uniform structure of R&D subsidies is superior to the usual uniform one as it 
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enhances aggregate profit and national welfare beyond a uniform one, and does not involve a 
retaliation concern. Whether the unilaterally optimal R&D policy was imposed or free trade 
prevailed as the initial state, it is asserted that a redesign of the initially-uniform R&D policy in 
a non-uniform way or a new imposition of non-uniform R&D policy leads the firms to 
rationalize their behavior in a way to create industry-wise profits. Since this welfare 
enhancement effect is strengthened as the degree of the non-uniformity of the firm-specific 
policy increases, this provides a country with an incentive to further strategically stimulate 
private sector decisions through an asymmetric system of the R&D policy.  
The main question, however, is about the practical implementation of such non-uniform policy. 
The theoretical model assumes that all firms or sectors are equal and will react in the same way 
in case of a redistribution of R&D subsidies. More specifically equation (1) asserts that 
parameter β, the cost-reducing effect of the R&D subsidy to a firm on its own marginal cost, 
and parameter α, the external cost-reducing effect spilled over from the R&D subsidy to all the 
other domestic firms, take the same value for all firms or sectors. By the way, in case α>0, we 
have positive spill-over externalities which may on its own be a reason for R&D subsidies. 
Equation (1) also asserts that the initial marginal costs, c, are the same for all firms or sectors. 
In case c, α and β are equal for each firm or sector, or when the government is unable to 
discriminate between firms or sectors with respect to these parameters, the policy of picking 
winners according to the analysis of the previous section boils down to throwing a dice to select 
the winners who will obtain all of the subsidies, whereas the others will lose. Obviously such 
policy is not feasible. First it will be legally not viable to select recipients of subsidies by a 
purely random selection mechanism. More importantly, however, the government may have 
some clue about which firms or sectors will qualify for being selected as winners. It implies 
that in reality the parameters c, α and β will indeed differ amongst firms and sectors. In that 
case it seems reasonable to select those firms or sectors which have the lowest value of c and 
the highest values of α and β so that subsidizing these firms or sectors is most efficient. Then, 
the next questions are: how does the government find out about these different c’s,  α’s and β’s; 
how do the firms or sectors react when the government is uncertain about the true values of  
these parameters, and how does the government assess differences between c, α and β in 
selecting winners to be backed?  
 From that perspective of practical policy implementation the remainder of this section focuses 
on how to realize the benefits of the non-uniform policy prescription and it looks at what 
loopholes and caveats the policy prescription contains. The pros and cons of the discriminatory 
industrial policy naturally reflect the flip side of each other and a successful implementation 
would require one to sort out and highlight the key factors of the pro side and to pay extra 
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caution to minimizing the con side. In that respect the discussion in the Netherlands on what 
innovation policy to conduct, with the innovation platform favoring a policy of backing winners, 
can act as reference case.  
 
3.1. Robustness and Benefits of ‘Backing Winners’ Idea 
 
This subsection builds upon the theoretical insights sketched in the previous section to provide 
a thinking box for an innovative policy authority on how to select winners and on how a policy 
authority can economize upon the benefits of such a policy. The robustness9 of the non-uniform 
industrial policy is illustrated first in order to highlight the superiority of a preferential 
innovative policy to uniform ones, when some of the assumptions of section 2 are relaxed, and 
then we extend our discussion to the issues that a policy authority need to pay cautions to.  
 
3.1.1. Superiority of a Preferential Policy to Uniform Ones 
The trade model described above emphasized the benefits of creating ex-post difference in 
marginal productivities through an asymmetric R&D policy. If the initial conditions were 
identical, then a government can simply realize the aggregate profit creation effect by 
redesigning or introducing a new policy in a way that treats the firms unequally. If the firms’ 
productivities were different initially, however, the optimal form of R&D policy would have 
been asymmetric as has been well-documented in the literature (see, e.g., Neary, 1994; Leahy 
and Montana, 1998; Kujal and Ruiz, 2007). Also, it has been pointed out that the optimal form 
of the export promotion policy is sensitive to the way firms interact and the optimal policy form 
depends on the parameters of the economy.  The basic rationale of the aggregate profit creation 
sketched in section 2 however can be shown to be robust to the above two concerns.  
(i) Heterogeneous Costs 
While the above aggregate profit creation effect can be most clearly illustrated when the firms 
have the same cost conditions, the heterogeneous cost case would be more practical and 
popular in reality.  When the firms are of different efficiency in the initial state, the optimal 
subsidy will be naturally asymmetric from the beginning, favoring the more efficient firms. In 
fact, it can be shown that the more efficient firm should be given a greater subsidy, which 
contrasts with the conventional ‘infant protection argument’ which favors a policy to help those 
firms or industries who are lacking in competitiveness. Suppose that the firms’ marginal costs 
                                                
9
 Only the asymmetric cost case and various competition conjectures are reviewed in this report. See Jo 
(2008) for the robustness to the other extensions such as various returns to scale in technology and 
‘international’ spillover of an R&D activity etc. 
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are asymmetric and denoted by ci and cj*. Given the initially optimal R&D subsidy {si} and 
{sj*} which would be asymmetric, let’s consider a redesigned domestic – only domestic for 
simplicity – subsidy{ }is%  for which 1= =∑ %ni is ns  does not change and the resulting new Nash 
equilibrium remains interior. Then the sum of the marginal costs ( )α β≡ − − −% %i i i ik c S s s  and 
j j j jk c S s sα β≡ − − −* * * * * *( *)  is preserved again after the subsidy redesign. Again Corollary 3 
applies and the aggregate cost can be expressed the same as (12), assuring the aggregate profit 
creation effect. The intuitive proof for an illustrative case that subsidies are rearranged at two 
firms is provided in the Appendix.  As to be mentioned below, the existing finding that the 
initially optimal policy is naturally asymmetric and the new finding from section 2 that an 
additional gain can be created by further increasing the degree of non-uniformity of the policy 
reinforce each other to shed a light on the main policy guideline of this paper – back the 
winners rather than encourage the losers.   
(ii) Various Competition Modes 
Although different characterizations of oligopolistic behavior would give rise to different 
policy suggestions (Eaton and Grossman, 1986), it can be shown that the aggregate profit 
creation argument as discussed above remains valid regardless of the specific form of the initial 
policy.  It can be illustrated using the conjectural variation parameters – developed by Bowley 
(1924) – following the convention in the literature. A firm’s conjectural variation is defined as 
the output response by the other firms in the industry that it conjectures would co-vary with its 
own output change. Formally, the conjectural variation parameters for domestic firm i and 
foreign j are defined by vi and *jv  such that ii vdxdQ +=1  and *1 jj vdydQ += . To simplify, 
let us assume that the firms have the symmetric conjectures: vvv ji == *  for all i and j. 1−<v  
implies a pricing below marginal cost and is strictly dominated by 1−=v  which case 
corresponds to a price-taking or a Bertrand game case. Since the equilibrium was assumed to be 
interior to guarantee positive outputs, the case of 1−=v  can be excluded, in which case only 
the most efficient firm would export. Therefore we can only consider 1−>v .10  Now let’s 
consider the domestic redesign of the initially uniform R&D subsidy {s} to {si} in a non-
uniform way that preserves the total subsidy expenditure, i.e. ∑
=
==
n
i i Snss1 . Then the profit 
maximization conditions (5) after the subsidy redesign are modified as follows: 
   
( ) ( )(1 ) 0
i
i
x i iπ P Q x P Q v k′= + + − = ; *( ) ( )(1 ) 0*yπ P Q yP Q v k′= + + − = ,               (13)          
                                                
10
 As special cases, v = 0 would correspond to the Cournot case, v > 0 represents the conjectures about 
more aggressive behavior than Cournot, and v = n+n*-1 to the collusive case.  Note that there would be 
no aggregate profit creation effect under homogeneous product Bertrand case. 
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where ( )i i ik c α S s βs≡ − − −  and ****** ))1(( sβαnck +−−= . The sum of these net 
marginal costs ∑∑
==
+
*
11 *
n
ji
n
i kk  remains unchanged and the corollary 3 applies. Substituting 
)1()( vPPkx ii +′−=  from (13) and using the variance identity for {ki}, the domestic 
aggregate cost is expressed as follows: 
              
( )212
2
1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )
n
n nii
i i k i
i i
k Pk x n k
P v n P v
σ
=
= =
 
 
= − − 
′ ′+ + 
 
∑
∑ ∑                              (14) 
Since 0>′P  and 1−>v , the above aggregate cost decreases when the variance 2kσ  increases 
and the aggregate profit creation effect is assured for a wide range of conjectural variations 
parameters. In the special case of  1−=v , the resulting equilibrium will involve corner 
solutions and only the most efficient firm is subsidized. In all the other cases in which the 
equilibrium remains interior, the aggregate profit creation effect holds true when extended to 
general conjectural variations.  
3.1.2. Implications for Backing Winners 
The unilaterally optimal subsidy in the conventional sense brings national benefits at the 
expense of trading rivals and thus the retaliation possibility seriously limits the practical 
applicability. A unilateral deletion of an on-going subsidy does not serve a national incentive. 
And a mutual reduction or deletion sounds ideal but is not self-enforcing due to its prisoners’ 
dilemma property or, even if agreeable, the operational or transaction cost – both visible and 
invisible - for it may amount to a non-negligible level. As such, a trade-intervention, once made, 
has a tendency of lasting for long. One way or another, an on-going policy can be justified and 
then the theoretical model shows that a non-uniform form outperforms a uniform structure. If 
the trade policy authority failed to realize it and the current subsidy were non-discriminatory, 
then the discussion of the previous section applies and the profit creation can be sought for.  
However, even if the actual imposition of the subsidies fully internalized the favorable market 
fundamentals behind and took an asymmetric structure, it is worthwhile to emphasize that such 
preferential subsidies outperforms the uniform subsidies in welfare improvement. A fairness 
argument for uniform subsidies might be raised but it should not necessarily be favored.11 
Rather, a subsidy redesign had better be made in a way that helps those firms which are already 
cost-competitive.  That is, backing the winners has to be the more relevant slogan an innovative 
policy authority should stick to rather than protecting the laggards. Such policy of ‘helping 
loosers’ has, by the way, been abolished by the Dutch government after a parliamentary enquiry 
                                                
11
 Section 4 discusses whether a redistribution scheme would be required or not. 
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in 1983/84 which revealed the failure of such industrial policy in the late 1960’s (so called 
RSV-enquiry). In addition to the aggregate profit creation incentive, the idea of backing 
winners is further strengthened when the policy implementation process involves a mechanism 
through which the firms put extra efforts to improve upon their initial productivity to be eligible 
for beneficial policies. This may have been the intention of the Dutch innovation platform when 
it organized a beauty-contest-like process in order to select the winners to be backed, and be 
named as key innovative sectors. This point is discussed in a greater detail in later subsections. 
3.1.3. Degree of Industrial Competition and Backing Potential Winners 
As a caveat of the basic model in section 2, the argument of the model does not limit the degree 
of asymmetry in the way the firms are treated.  In an extreme case the policy may try and create 
a national champion so that some firms have to exit as the degree of unequal treatment 
increases further. The market may become more concentrated and the ex-ante conditions for 
aggregate profit creation may be distorted. Not only the initially assumed uniform policy may 
be ungrounded but the strengthened market power of the exporting firms may also bring a 
detrimental effect to the trading partners, particularly the importing country, which may induce 
the other countries to impose a countervailing policy.  It is also true that optimal form of the 
initial policy even before the preferential rearrangement of it may be sensitive to the relative 
size of the domestic and foreign firms. Too many domestic firms may induce over-competition 
among the domestic firms, jeopardizing the potential welfare benefits from a subsidy, and too 
few firms may case an anti-competitive market distortions. As such, the policy authority should 
make sure that the players in the market remain active and the potential newcomers should be 
allowed to freely enter if they find it profitable. The right degree of competition in the industry 
should be maintained and in this regard lifting entry and exit barriers is important. The dynamic 
benefits of the preferential innovative policy as contrasted to a uniform structure therefore 
hinge upon the idea of backing potential winners as well as the existing winners. In other words, 
the policy should be keen on also ‘backing challengers’, as advocated by Jacobs and Theeuwes 
(2005).   
 
3.2. Rationalization upon the Cost-Saving Effects (α, β) of an Innovative Policy and 
Importance of Commitment 
 
The basic rationale in section 2 relies on the following three key features: the ability of a policy 
authority to commit to a policy, the effectiveness of R&D in reducing own costs, and the extent 
of spill-over effects. First, the commitment by government toward a particular policy 
constitutes an important part in the multi-stage economic models in which firms’ strategic 
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behavior follows the previous decision by the policy authority.  As has been well indicated in 
game theory literature, a non-credible promise or threat does not constrain the behavior of the 
other players. This is why coordination or an aggressive behavior in private level often lacks in 
sustaining tendency even if it were agreed or tried. Unless such idea stays in its best interest, 
the firm would not behave as it initially declared or promised. This means that the 
rationalization effect to create the aggregate profits in section 2 will be realized only with the 
government’s ability to commit to a set of industrial policy, only after which the domestic firms 
will adjust their behavior from their own rationalization incentive. 
In the introduction of section 3 we argued that the assumption of the basic model in section 2 
that the cost-reducing effects are symmetric across the firms in an industry or across the 
industries, is not realistic in practice. The case of heterogeneous costs discussed earlier already 
shows how the policy of backing winners can be designed when the initial marginal costs 
parameter c in equation (1) vary across firms or sectors. In reality, however, the spill-over cost-
improving effect (α) and the own cost-reducing effect (β) of an R&D policy would also vary 
depending on to whom the subsidy is given. An asymmetric structure of α and β would be a 
norm rather than an exception, which case can be illustrated by the following marginal cost to 
firm i after the R&D policy: 
- -i i ij j i i
j i
k c s sα β
≠
= ∑                                                       (15) 
A higher αij means a higher spillover effect and a higher βi implies that a subsidy also improves 
the subsidy- recipient’s cost in a greater degree. And in the aggregate production cost (12), it 
becomes obvious that the policy authority can further realize the welfare-enhancing effect by 
distributing the subsidies in a way that the firms with a higher β
 
receive higher subsidies and 
those with lower β receive lower subsidies. By the same token, the firms that create a higher 
spill-over effect in terms of improving other firms’ efficiency are to be preferentially treated. 
The latter also implies that an industry which overall shows a higher spill-over is to be given a 
priority as well if selecting industries were the issue.  The ideal selection of the beneficiary to 
be backed by the innovative policies therefore could begin by looking at the size of α and β for 
the firms across the industries to select the right industries first and then apply a non-uniform 
structure of subsidies to the firms in those industries.   
 
3.3. Mechanism Design for an Efficient Monitoring 
The criteria to back the right winners are rather straightforward as summarized above. The 
more challenging issue is developing an information-gathering mechanism to sort out the firms 
based on their productivities, self-cost-saving effects and spill-over effects. The government 
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needs to utilize the existing data to derive detailed intuitions about the productivities for the 
firms in an industry before and after R&D subsidies were imposed.  And for a sustainable effect 
of welfare improvement, it is important to design and operate the mechanism through which the 
preferential selection of the firms be made in an efficient way. While it is natural that the policy 
authority does not have complete information about the private sector’s parameters, a well-
designed mechanism may bring about an additional benefit to the economy by inducing the 
firms to take extra efforts to improve upon their pre-policy efficiency to be eligible for the 
subsidy rewards. On the other hand, the risk of rent-seeking behavior is present when the 
government’s discriminatory policy is designed upon the observed performances of the firms. 
Therefore a successful implementation of the policy has to be of such a form in which all the 
agents get to internalize the costs and benefits within their own behavioral incentive system. 
Below we non-technically address such issues related with the informational details and the 
behavioral incentives of the firms. Transaction cost issues arising from the opportunistic 
behavior concern are also discussed. 
 
3.3.1. Incomplete Information 
One of the major skepticisms against an interventionism is that it presumes a good information 
of industry details – cost, demand, the mode of competition etc. – on the part of policy maker. 
Policy authority, however, is only limitedly informed. The first natural observation is that firms 
would behave opportunistically in order to influence their entitlement to policy benefits. Over-
investment can be the consequence. This concern was absent in the model in section 2 by 
assuming out private level investment or by assuming private investment was optimal. Under 
an incomplete information situation, a government may invent a policy menu combining a 
reward and a penalty through which the firms get to reveal their true types so that the 
government can reflect on the actions taken by the firms to come up with the appropriate form 
of discriminatory policy (separating equilibrium). In that the uniform policy would be the 
alternative if the screening effort fails and the ex-ante private information were not revealed 
(pooling equilibrium), well-designed mechanism would be inevitable for a successful 
realization of the best welfare outcome.  On the contrary, a separating equilibrium in which 
different types of firms take different actions enabling the government to treat them 
discriminatorily is not always a better option than a pooling equilibrium in which all the firms 
take the same actions and are treated in a uniform way. In this regards, a policy maker should 
pay extra attention to the details of the incomplete information when designing an innovative 
policy.  
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3.3.2. An Additional Benefit of Inducing Efficiency Improving Efforts 
When the innovative policy is to be imposed in a discriminatory way based on the pre-policy 
efficiency level of the firms, the firms would take it as an incentive scheme and would try to 
enhance their productivity even before the subsidy assignment to the firms. A virtuous cycle of 
high productivity-high subsidy-high productivity will further separate the good firms from the 
bad firms, and the preferential subsidy mechanism can set a binding platform for this self-
selecting process. This additional efficiency-gaining effect is distinguished from the usual 
screening mechanism which is often useful under an asymmetric information situation. The 
latter solely aims to separate the good firms from the bad firms while the proposed R&D policy 
implementation mechanism would drive even the less efficient firms to put in their efforts not 
to further stay behind. That is, not only the separating equilibrium but also the pooling 
equilibrium may bring a welfare gain from the national perspective. To compensate those firms 
who improved in efficiency yet ended up receiving lower subsidies due to its lower-than-
average productivity improvement, the government may introduce an additional subsidy if 
available. 
 
3.3.3. Concern of Rent-Seeking Behavior and Other Transaction Costs 
However, when selecting the right firms is the central focus of the mechanism, the firms’ 
efforts to receive a high subsidy may lead the firms to behave to the selection mechanism only. 
The so-called rent-seeking behavior may prevail before the actual subsidy assignment. This 
rent-seeking incentive typically leads to the prisoners’ dilemma situation, in which all firms 
tend to take an action only to be picked for a higher subsidy but with no practical contribution 
toward the meaningful efficiency improvement, yielding the socially undesirable outcome.  
This phenomenon can be clearly captured by designing a game in which the order of 
movements between the firms and government is reversed (see e.g. Gruenspecht, 1988). If  the 
government assigns subsidies after firms take an action to signal their types in terms of their 
productivities, all the firms would have an incentive to over-invest for a lower cost to be 
eligible for a more beneficial subsidy. The subsidy assignment mechanism can help to mitigate 
such an incentive if the mechanism contains the self-adjusting system in which those who 
received a higher subsidy yet did not show a meaningful performance in productivity gain ex-
post should be further penalized through a lower subsidy. The plausibility of an effective 
incentive mechanism for the genuine cost-reducing efforts prior to the subsidy assignment can 
be seen through the framework of the repeated games in game theory. Firms would select to 
play opportunistically when the game is played only once or just a few finite times. But when 
the firms are conscious of the through monitoring mechanism in which the policy authority 
regularly updates the details, they will necessarily weigh the potential gains and losses from 
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such an opportunistic behavior. In this regard, a deliberately designed follow-up program of the 
industrial policy is needed to manipulate the subsidy recipients to behave toward the socially 
desirable outcome. The productivity gaining efforts by a firm to be eligible for a higher subsidy 
could be exercised through a visible investment in new technology or penetrating into a new 
market for a higher scale economy realization. Or firms might seek an efficiency gain through 
non-tangible resources which had been available yet not utilized. All kinds like operational, 
technical and managerial resources might have not been optimally exercised and the R&D 
policy mechanism would give the firms to reach their optimal utilization for all possible 
business areas. These all contribute toward reducing the transaction costs, which need to be all 
counted as the positive feature of the mechanism.  The transaction costs can be saved on the 
policy authority side as well throughout the whole channels of sorting out the recipients – 
assigning subsidies – and monitoring the outcome for the next rounds of subsidy imposition. 
 
4. Miscellaneous Issues 
4.1. R&D Joint Venture versus Adversarial Approach 
As another meaningful intuition, the relative size of α and β in (15) can shed a light on the 
debate about which policy between R&D joint venture – i.e. cooperation among the firms – and 
adversarial approach is to be adopted.  Particularly, related with the possibility of the rent-
seeking behavior by the firms as an opportunistic behavior, it is worthwhile to make comments 
on the issue of whether a cooperative R&D joint venture should be preferred or the 
conventional adversarial approach should be favored (see e.g., Neary and O’Sullvan, 1999).   
One concern about the adversarial approach is that it provides a firm an incentive to over-invest 
or under-invest.  The former case matters if the spill-over effect is negligible and thus a firm 
has an incentive to more-than-optimally invest to give itself a strategic advantage against its 
rivals in subsequent product-market competition. And the latter case becomes real if the spill-
over effect is substantial and thus a firm faces an incentive to less-than-optimally invest lest its 
rivals enjoy the benefits of its investments.  The basic model in section 2 assumed out this issue 
of a suboptimal level of private investment by implicitly treating the private activity stage only 
through the cost-reducing effects of the investment. However, the issue remains a concern and 
encouraging an R&D joint venture as an alternative to the above-addressed adversarial 
approach could be an option. Given the two-faced potential sub-optimality of an outcome when 
non-adversarial approach was adopted, we can at least suggest a rule-of-thumb criterion on the 
matter: when the spill-over effects (αij) dominate the own-cost reducing effect (βi), an R&D 
joint venture had better be encouraged through which the cost-reducing effect of an R&D 
policy will be maximized although the aggregate profit creation may not be obtainable. 
Otherwise, an adversarial policy through an asymmetric treatment of individual firms should be 
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given a priority. It is noteworthy that the innovation platform, in its beauty contest to select the 
key innovative sectors in the Netherlands, very much favored those sectors where firms 
appeared to be able to present themselves jointly in the beauty contest. The implicit intuition of 
the innovation platform behind this design of the contest may be the desire to enhance future 
spill-over effects in addition to finding out in which sectors there already were joint R&D 
ventures.   
 
4.2.  Corrective Objective versus Strategic Objective 
While the main part of our analysis focuses on the strategic objective of an industrial policy, a 
policy authority may also have a distortion-corrective objective in mind. In particular, in 
connection with the R&D activity by the private firms that are to be influenced by an R&D 
policy, the possible sub-optimality of the private firm level investment as raised in the above 
might induce a government to try to catch both rabbits. Therefore, it has to be understood that 
the optimal form of the industrial policy – subsidy or tax – depends on which incentive 
outweighs. From a corrective policy perspective, a tax would have to be imposed if the spill-
over effect of an R&D subsidy causes an over-investment for a firm and a subsidy would be 
optimal if an under-investment is caused. Yet the optimal form of policy from a strategic 
perspective depends on the other factors such as consumer demand and the completion mode 
among the firms. If both motives reinforce each other, it is not a concern. However, if the two 
motives are counteractive, the relative importance of the two objects has to be well weighed 
before a preferential redesign of the policy is introduced.   
 
4.3. A Political Economic Concern: Redistribution Scheme  
From the usual perspective of positive economics, when there are winners and losers with the 
winners’ gain bigger than the losers’ loss, an appropriate domestic redistribution scheme for a 
Pareto-efficiency will have to be introduced. A government may want to do this to ensure all 
participants gain. However, in light of the specific purpose of innovation policy, such as is the 
objective of e.g. the Dutch innovation platform, one may even leave the outcome as it is. In that 
way it can be utilized as an incentive scheme for the firms to improve their technology and cost 
conditions to further guarantee a higher subsidy. In a good scenario, the incentive scheme will 
lead all the firms in the industry to reach a higher efficiency in absolute terms. If then, the 
subsidy redesign may rely on the relative measure of efficiency gains to reward only those with 
high efficiency improvement while those firms with a below-average efficiency gain will still 
get penalized and receive a lower subsidy. A government may take another stance by rewarding 
all those with an efficiency gain yet in a discriminatory way.  The firms’ efforts will be praised 
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although unevenly. Of course such non-uniform policy of ‘backing strong winners’ and 
‘backing ordinary winners’ requires an additional fund for the subsidy spending.  The 
opportunity cost of the public fund will become an issue again, and the government will have to 
weigh all the related costs and benefits. The costs side would involve both the visible cost and 
the invisible transaction costs while the benefits should entail the screening effects in this 
asymmetric information environment to effectively distinguish the low-cost firms from the 
high-cost firms as well as the usual cost-saving encouraging benefits. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper discusses policy options for industrial and innovation policy using a new feature in 
strategic trade policy.  It illustrates in a theoretical case in an international oligopolistic market 
under complete information situation that a non-uniform innovation policy through R&D 
subsidies is superior to a uniform policy in its domestic welfare enhancing effect. It is shown 
that the usual retaliation concern that arises from its adverse welfare effects abroad does not 
apply and that the case holds true under a variety of behavioural conjectures among the firms. 
The theoretical argument is found useful in the debate on whether a targeted innovation policy 
is warranted in case the government is to ‘pick’ or ‘back’ winners.  
Although the benchmark model was sketched in the ideal world with symmetric Cournot firms 
and it can be extended to the non-Cournot cases as well, asymmetric costs cases in the initial 
state are more realistic and also the cost-saving effect on the firms or sectors of R&D subsides 
will rather be asymmetric. It implies that the government will have to exploit a priori 
information on the differences of cost reduction that the R&D subsidy will bring about. That is 
especially true for the size of the spill-over effects which are positive externalities and may lead 
to under-investment in R&D unless it is internalized within the system or through an industrial 
policy. The problem is that the government has incomplete information on the true initial 
efficiency levels of the firms and on the extent of cost reduction that the subsidy will bring 
about. Firms may be induced to behave strategically to persuade the government through an 
information revelation, which could even lead to over-investment and to rent seeking. It 
requires the government to design a carefully deliberated strategy for innovation policy and 
must at least be consistent in keeping that strategy. Nonetheless, the rationale of the aggregate 
profit creation remains valid as long as the policy maker can sort out the informational 
asymmetry to clearly configure the initially optimal policy form. Furthermore, it may bring 
about the additional benefit of inducing extra efforts on the firms’ side. 
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From this perspective, our analysis discusses the various strategic issues for a targeted 
innovation policy with their pros and cons. It takes as example the strategy of the Dutch 
innovation platform, which designed a beauty contest in order to select key innovative sectors 
in the Netherlands following the policy proposals to conduct a policy of ‘backing winners’. 
Informational configuration about the current efficiency conditions of the market participants 
has to be preceded and also the potential efficiency-gains through the policy has to be well 
estimated, while the potential opportunistic behavior by the firms should be discouraged. A 
carefully designed mechanism to provide the firms the right incentives and also to monitor their 
post-policy behavior should be combined as well. In addition, the ‘challengers’ should not be 
completely isolated from the whole picture and the strategic details of the policy should entail 
backing the right winners – both existing and potential.  
As a final remark, we note that the analysis of this paper does, by no means, rule out the 
possibility that the ex-ante optimal form of the policy may be indeterminate or that the 
informational complexity may lead to a substantial transaction cost loss so that eventually it has 
negative welfare implications. The discussion of the policy options in this paper only has a 
qualitative character and is based on modern theory of strategic firm behavior.  A more fully 
fledged analysis would need a formal treatment of the specific strategies. Then a quantification 
of the net welfare effects that the optimal design of the policy strategies can bring about, is to 
be made. These net welfare effects may turn out to be positive, but can also very well appear to 
be negative. In other words, in spite of the theoretical model of this paper, which provides an 
argument for backing winners, in practice the cons of such policy may outweigh the pros. This 
is the scope for future research.        
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Appendix 
1. Proof of aggregate profit creation when the subsidies are rearranged only at two firms: 
(i) Homogeneous cost 
Consider the case where the initially-uniform subsidies are rearranged only at two of 
the n initially identical domestic firms, which we denote by firm 1 and firm 2. Initially 
s1 = s2, k1 = k2 and x1 = x2. Assume the subsidy is reduced on firm 1 and raised on firm 2, 
preserving their sum. Then ∆k1 >0, ∆k2 <0, ∆k1 +∆k2 = 0 and it follows from Proposition 
4 and Lemma 3 that ∆x1 < 0, ∆x2 > 0 and ∆x1 +∆x2 =0. Given this, we explore the 
change in aggregate production cost for the domestic firms given by the following: 
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In the above, the second and the third term is equal to zero because k1 = k2 , ∆x1 + ∆x2 = 
0 and x1 = x2, ∆k1 + ∆k2 = 0, respectively. And the first term (∆k1∆x1 + ∆k2∆x2) will be 
strictly negative since ∆xi and ∆ki take the opposite sign from each other.  Therefore, 
the change in aggregate cost in (A1) is strictly negative. 
 
(ii) Heterogeneous Cost 
Now suppose the firms costs were asymmetric initially for two firms; 21 cc > and 
1 2s s<  initially, and subsidies are redesigned only on these two firms in such way that 
∆s1<0, ∆s2 >0 and ∆s1+∆s2=0. Then, it follows that ∆ k1>0, ∆k2<0 and ∆k1+∆k2=0 and 
Proposition 4 implies that ∆x1<0, ∆x2>0 and ∆x1 + ∆x2=0. Therefore k1 > k2 and x1 < x2.  
From (17), the aggregate production cost is 
                ( ) ( ) ( ).221122112211 kxkxxkxkxkxk ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆∆+∆∆                  (24) 
The first term in (24) remains strictly negative. The second term is also strictly negative 
since k1∆x1 < 0, k2∆x2 > 0 and |k1∆x1| > |k2∆x2|, and the third term is also strictly 
negative since x1∆k1 > 0, x2∆k2 < 0 and |x1∆k1| < |x2∆k2|. Hence the aggregate production 
cost decreases and the aggregate profit increases. One implication from this subsection 
is that a country should help those firms which are already cost-competitive, which 
contrasts with the conventional infant industry argument. 
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